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The Precarious Place of Labour Rights and
Movements in Nigeria's Dual Economic and
Political Transition, 1999-2005
Obiora Chinedu Okafor*

Abstract
Caught between pressure from dominant global economic actors (such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and certain states) to
implement painful socio-economic reform measures, and pressure from significant
numbers of their own peoples to reject these IMF/WB-style prescriptions, formally
democratic "third world" governments often yield to the demands of the former to
push through such reforms, sometimes at great social cost. This article utilizes a
contemporary Nigerian case study to illustrate this point and to show how the
curtailment of labour rights and the weakening of labour movements have formed
an important part of the economic strategy of many such governments. This antilabour rights/movements strategy is an attempt by governments to deal with the
human rights contradictions that are often generated when third world countries
attempt dual political and economic transitions. The article argues that the
deployment of an anti-labour strategy is grounded in a new kind of "full belly
thesis" that prioritizes a particular IMF/WB-friendly vision of economic development
over certain kinds of political (especially labour) rights. The powerful global
economic actors, who would otherwise advocate the observance of all human
rights, have nevertheless found this thesis more acceptable than its earlier iteration,
which was grounded in a far less IMF/WB-friendly economic vision.

INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the question of the precarious place of labour rights
and movements in Nigeria's dual economic and political transition in the
context of global currents around the same issue. This issue remains central
today given the democratic inertia in many previously well-regarded third
Associate professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, Canada. PhD,
LLM (University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada); LLM, LLB (Hons) (University of
Nigeria, Enugu Campus). This paper is part of a much larger study of labour-led human
rights activism in Nigeria. For the generous funds that made that study and this paper
possible, I am grateful to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of
Canada (SSHRC). I am grateful to Paul D Ocheje, Rhoda Howard, Bonny Ibhawoh, Mia
Mouelhi, Helen Tewolde and Saleema Khimji) for engaging with me on various aspects
of this paper. I also thank Pius Okoronkwo and Tony Ceaser Okeke for their research
assistance. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Chima Ubani (1963-2005), one of
Nigeria's most intelligent, committed, politically educated and respected human rights
activists. Adieu, Chima; adieu great soul.
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world countries and the economic troubles that continue to afflict even
many of the states that had earlier been touted as successes. The paper
begins with an overview of the human rights tensions that have often
accompanied attempts by third world countries to undertake dual political
and economic transitions, that is, the attempt to institute certain painful
International Monetary Fund/World Bank-style market liberalization and
other reforms while simultaneously attempting to transform relatively
authoritarian political systems into more democratic ones. While the roles,
functions and prescriptions of the World Bank differ in important respects
from those of the International Monetary Fund, on the important issues
discussed in this article the two institutions share similar views and, as
such, while it is recognized that they do not constitute a monolith, they will
be discussed together. The article examines the specific nature of Nigeria's
contemporary dual transition, and, at the same time, relates this discussion
to the character of earlier dual transitions. The focus of the analysis here is
on two key economic reform policies that were implemented by the quasidemocratic Obasanjo regime (sharp fuel price hikes and the down-sizing of
the public sector). Subsequently, the nature of the labour-led mass
resistance to these economic reform policies (especially to the sharp fuel
price hikes), as well as the character of the intensified state repression that
was visited on the labour movement-led coalition that formed the vanguard
of the popular resistance to these policies, are discussed. To conclude, the
emergence of a new "full belly thesis" is suggested. The new thesis differs in
specific content from, and has been in practice treated as far more benign
than, the old thesis. The reasons for this, and the merit or otherwise of the
newer thesis, are also discussed.
To be clear, it is important to note that while many interesting if more
subsidiary issues (such as a more detailed analysis of the jurisprudence of
the Nigerian courts on the right to strike) are of necessity implicated by
the analysis presented in this article, the focus of the article is squarely on
understanding the human rights (and therefore, socio-legal) contradictions of
certain aspects of the conventional IMF/WB-style socio-economic reform paradigms as they were implemented in Nigeria between 1999-2005. For necessary
parsimony, in order to maintain focus, and due to space constraints, fuller
treatment of those more subsidiary issues will await another article. This is not
to say, of course, that appropriate consideration was not given to these issues
in the course of developing this article. Those issues are, in fact, discussed in
the article to the extent that is necessary for the development of its thesis.
Finally, on a methodological note, the article falls within a long tradition
of socio-legal scholarship; one that does not so narrowly construe the
boundaries of law and legal inquiry as to reduce legal scholarship to purely
(or even largely) doctrinal studies. It makes use of and situates legal
doctrine and court decisions as appropriate, but focuses on broader metalegal questions that both implicate and transcend such doctrines and case
law. This of necessity reduces the amount of space that can be allotted
within the article to the parsing of court decisions and basic legal doctrine.
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THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN DUAL TRANSITIONS
There is evidence that the kind of radical and painful economic reforms
advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, to some extent,
the World Bank (WB), have been pursued equally by authoritarian
regimes and more democratic governments,1 but, as Paul Ocheje
correctly notes, it is also true that "outside of [the established
democracies of] Western Europe, radical market-oriented growth strategies have been pursued more often by authoritarian than democratic
governments". 2 This result is attributable in significant measure to the
strong resistance that is often mounted against such painful reforms in

the democracies and semi-democracies of the third world by poor
majorities, labour movements, civil society groups, and other similarly
affected segments of the population. As Nelson has put it, "austerity
measures such as wage freezes or reduced food or fuel subsidies often
catalyze mass protests". 3 Historically, authoritarian governments have,
therefore, been seen as more able to push through such reforms in the
face of mass resistance. 4 Indeed, as Nelson noted in 1989, "conventional
wisdom has long held that authoritarian governments are more likely
than democracies to adopt and enforce unpopular economic stabilization
and adjustment measures".5 Later work by Bangura and Gibbons
confirms the dominant role that this conventional wisdom has played
in the relevant political analysis of economic reform. 6 And although
there is significant evidence that runs contrary to the conventional
wisdom, 7 and the bulk of the literature finds no relationship one way or
the other regarding whether authoritarian regimes are better at
implementing harsh IMF/WB-style economic reforms, 8 the conventional
wisdom has still not completely lost its allure. Even Nelson concluded

1

2

3
4

5
6
7
8

See JM Nelson "The politics of long-haul economic reform" in JM Nelson et al Fragile
Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment (1989, Overseas Development Council) 3 at
16.
See P Ocheje "Memo to symposium participants" Conference on "Human Rights and
Development: The Challenge of Dual Transition" (2005) University of Windsor, Canada

(on file with author) at 2. See also S Schlosstein Asia's New Little Dragons: The Dynamic
Emergence of Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia (1991, Contemporary Books).
See Nelson "The politics of long-haul economic reform", above at note 1 at 7.
See J Toye "Interest group politics and the implementation of adjustment policies in
Sub-Saharan Africa" in Y Bangura, P Gibbon and A Ofstad (eds) Authoritarianism,
Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa (1992, The
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies) 106 at 106-26. See also Y Bangura and
P Gibbon "Adjustment, authoritarianism and democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa: an
introduction to some conceptual and empirical issues" in id 7 at 34.
See Nelson "The politics of long-haul economic reform", above at note 1 at 15.
See Bangura and Gibbon, "Adjustment, authoritarianism and democracy", above at
note 4 at 13.
See Nelson "The politics of long-haul economic reform", above at note 1 at 16.
See S Haggard and RR Kaufman The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (1995,
Princeton University Press) at 152 and 309-34.
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that newer democracies tend to have more problems with implementing
such reforms. 9
It follows that a minimum level of authoritarianism or autocratic rule,
however mild, is still seen by many key actors as necessary for the successful
implementation of the kinds of harsh policies that are almost always
"recommended" to third world states by the IMF and the WB. At the very least,
certain democratic rights have been seen as amenable to curtailment in
certaincontexts in the interest of the successful implementation of these kinds
of economic reform - reforms that have tended to inflict much pain on the
poor majority of most of the countries that have come under IMFIWB tutelage
over the last couple of decades. This is perhaps one important reason why, on
the whole, the current civilian regime in Nigeria still enjoys a reasonably
good reputation in the West and at the IMF/WB, even in the face of its visibly
poor record of protecting labour and other such human rights. 10 This issue
will be discussed in detail in the sections below, but the point that is made in
those sections in relation to the period between 1999-2005 is captured in
Bangura's 1992 prediction that "it is apparent that economic reforms of the
type formulated in most African countries [that is IMFfWB-style reforms] ...
will be difficult to implement in a liberal democratic framework".11
However, as Gibbons has shown, the deployment of authoritarianism
(and the curtailment of rights that it entails) in order to push through
harsh IMF/WB-style reforms only intensifies if civil society (made up of
labour, human rights, professional groups, etc) is, in the first place, strong
12
enough to provide the basis for resistance to the unpopular measures;
without a sufficiently strong civil society, the kind of intensified
9 See Nelson "The politics of long-haul economic reform", above at note 1 at 16.
10 This good international reputation is underscored by the current president's treatment at the US White House in Washington, DC; by the West in general; and by the
IMFIWB's top hierarchy. For example, in August 2003, US president George W Bush
praised Obasanjo as follows: "Listen, Nigeria is a very important country on the
continent of Africa. And because of your forthrightness and your style and your
commitment, you're a very important leader on this continent. And I'm honored to
be here with you" [emphasis added], available at: <http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/
wwwhxaug03f.html> (last accessed 2 October 2005). Human Rights Watch has also
noted that: "Both Western donor countries and other African governments have
been reluctant to criticize Nigeria's human rights record publicly ever since
President Obasanjo first came to power in 1999. Five years on, he has continued
to enjoy wide international support", available at: <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/
nigeria06O4/4.htm> (last accessed 2 October 2005). For his own part, the IM's
resident representative in Nigeria, Gary G Moser, has recently lauded "President
Obasanjo's efforts to provide a brighter future for all Nigerians - indeed, for all
Africans, given his role in NEPAD". See GG Moser "The IMF and Nigeria, an enduring
relationship" (on file with author) at 1.
11 See Y Bangura "Authoritarian rule and democracy in Africa: a theoretical discourse" in
Y Bangura, P Gibbon and A Ofstad (eds) Authoritarianism,Democracy and Adjustment: The
Politics of Economic Reform in Africa (1992, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies)
39 at 79.
12 See P Gibbon "Structural adjustment and pressures toward multipartyism in SubSaharan Africa" in Y Bangura, P Gibbon and A Ofstad (eds) Authoritarianism, Democracy

71

72

JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW

VOL 51, NO 1

authoritarianism or rights curtailment that often accompanies IMF[Bstyle reforms is unlikely to be observed. This perhaps explains the strident
efforts of the current civilian regime in Nigeria to curtail labour rights and
to weaken the capacity of labour and its civil society allies to mass mobilize
Nigerians in opposition to the implementation of the government's
economic reform agenda. Nigerian civil society groups are widely acknowl13
edged as among the most dynamic, creative and resilient in Africa.
Significant human rights tensions have too often become manifest in the
simultaneous or dual attempt to deepen democracy and institute painful
IMF/WB-style economic reforms. If democracy is to offer certain human rights
protections and empower the people to take control of their own political
affairs, would they be likely to endorse the kinds of economic reform
measures that their governments have agreed to implement under the
tutelage of the LMF? And if they reject such measures (as has happened in
Nigeria and many other countries), what is to be done? Should the reform
measures be rammed through in spite of widespread popular and democratic
opposition to their implementation? If authoritarian and semi-autocratic
regimes have tended to be more successful at implementing such economic
reforms against such popular resistance, to what extent should the transition
to or broadening of democracy be limited for the presumed economic good
of a country? If liberal democracies and quasi-democracies (outside the
established ones in western Europe) have tended to be less successful or as
unsuccessful at pushing through such painful reforms, to what extent should
countries under reform sacrifice or limit important human rights in order to
ensure the better implementation of these painful measures? Does this
kind of authoritarianism really work in the long term? And what are the
implications of the findings of this case study of the Nigerian experience
between 1999 and 2005 for human rights and other theories?
I will return to these questions after an examination of the nature of
Nigeria's economic and political reform agenda; an exposition and
discussion of the character of the labour-led resistance to at least one key
aspect of these reform measures; and an analysis of the government's
targeted and intensified efforts to curtail labour rights and weaken the
labour movement.
THE NATURE OF NIGERIA'S DUAL TRANSITION
At least since 1985, Nigeria has been engaged, albeit in fits and starts, in a
simultaneous (or dual) political and economic transition. 14 The political
contd
and Adjustment: The Politicsof Economic Reform in Africa (1992, The Scandinavian Institute of
African Studies) 127 at 166.
13 See TM Shaw "Africa in the New World Order: marginal and/or central?" in A Adedeji
(ed)Africa within the World (1993, ACDESS, Ijebu Ode, Nigeria) at 91-92. See also OC Okafor

Legitimizing Human Rights NGOs: Lessons from Nigeria (2006, Africa World Press).
14 See P Lewis "From prebendalism to predation: the political economy of decline in
Nigeria" (1996) 34 The Journal of Modern African Studies 79 at 79-80.
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component of this dual transition is aimed at not just ridding the polity of
military rule but, more importantly, at resuscitating and deepening
Nigeria's hitherto failed attempt at democratic governance. 15 During the
1979-1983 era, Nigeria practised a system of imperfect, but by and large
democratic, civilian governance.16 The economic dimension of this dual
transition is directed at the "structural adjustment" of the Nigerian
economy along the general lines typically recommended in the IMF/WB
proposals for reform in third world countries.1 7 To date, neither transition
has been fully realized. This is so despite the military's much-heralded
handover of power to the current Obasanjo-led civilian regime in 1999, and
the virtually continuous prosecution of an IMF/WB-inspired and supported
reform programme (albeit with differing degrees of intensity) since the
mid-1980s.
The continued failure to achieve the aims of the political transition in
Nigeria can be understood against the backdrop of the Babangida regime's
insincere attempts at a return to civil rule; the subsequent capture of power
by the notoriously dictatorial Abacha-regime; the continued negative effects
of decades of military rule on the mind set of too many political leaders in
Nigeria; and the authoritarian tendencies that have been ingrained in many
of Nigeria's current political leaders and actors as a result. If Pini Jason is
correct to describe the later years of the Babangida regime as "a bare-knuckle
dictatorship",18 it is as valid to label the Abacha regime as the iron-fisted
holder of "the all time record for human rights disrespect and atrocities" in
Nigeria,19 as well as to characterize the current civilian Obasanjo-led regime
20
as, at best, both semi-democratic and semi-autocratic.
If Nigeria's attempt at a transition to democracy is as yet inchoate, its
current economic reform project, on which the rest of this section focuses,

can only be described as fledgling. Despite its long pedigree in the
structural adjustments of the 1980s and 1990s, this reform project has yet
to make its mark in terms of concretely uplifting the living standards
of Nigerians. Indeed, in reality, things may have actually worsened for
Nigeria's poor majority.
15 See, generally, General Abdulsalami Abubakar's address to the nation on the eve of the
hand-over of government and inauguration of the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo,
"Time to break cycle of instability and mistrust" (29 May 1999), available at: <http://
www.dawodu.com/abub.htm> (last accessed 3 October 2005); and 0 Obasanjo
"Independence day address to the nation" (1 October 2000), available at: <http://
www.dawodu.com/obas4.htm> (last accessed 3 October 2005).
16 On the imperfections during the 1960-66 era, see PC Aka "Nigeria since May 1999:
understanding the paradox of civil rule and human rights violations under
president Olusegun Obasanjo" (2003) San Diego International Law Journal 209 at 221.
On the incidence of intolerance of the opposition during the 1979-1983 era, see JO
Ihonvbere "A critical evaluation of the failed 1990 coup in Nigeria" (1991) 29 The
Journal of Modern African Studies 601 at 606.
17 Ihonvbere "A critical evaluation", above at note 16 at 607.
18 Quoted in id at 620.
19 See Aka "Nigeria since May 1999", above at note 16 at 223.
20 Id at 228-64.

73

74

JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW

VOL 51, NO 1

The current reform agenda is intimately linked to earlier agendas that
had been articulated and substantially executed by the Babangida regime,
and to a lesser extent, the Abacha junta. 21 Within weeks of coming to
power in a military coup in 1985, and aware of the economy's continuing
downward spiral, Babangida opened a nationwide debate on the
desirability of taking an IMF loan and subjecting Nigeria to IMF tutelage
under a structural adjustment programme (SAP) agreement with that
institution. 22 When it became clear that a broad based majority coalition
of Nigerians had returned a negative verdict on whether Nigeria should
come to terms with the IMF in the stated way, the Babangida regime
performed the kind of deft (some say cunning and disingenuous)
manoeuvre that the regime later became known for. 23 The junta publicly
repudiated IMF financing 24 and announced a package of supposedly
"home grown" measures financed by the World Bank. 25 Barely a year later,
the regime locked in open embrace with the IMF when it introduced a
formal SAP 26 which required Nigeria to remove 80 per cent of the
supposed subsidy on petroleum products (translating to dramatically
increased fuel prices), privatize government held corporations, retrench
large numbers of its public service employees, and levy significant cuts on
the salaries of those employees who did not lose their jobs. 27 The earlier
"home grown" reform programme had contained virtually the same
elements as this subsequent IMFfWB-dictated SAP. The Abacha regime
(which was mostly composed of Babangida-era military officers and
politicians) at various times either went along with or repudiated this
IMF/WB-inspired and supported SAP. The Abubakar regime, which barely
lasted twelve months, was too brief to make a difference one way or the
other in this respect.
Not surprisingly, the key elements of Babangida's economic reform
agenda, whether under the SAP or the earlier "home grown" package, have
re-emerged under the current Obasanjo government's economic reform
programme. Since 1999, with a very short break in 2002, the Obasanjo
government has shown a commitment, in the face of sustained mass
opposition, to dramatic and incessant fuel price hikes or, as it is often put,
to the removal of "subsidies" on petroleum products. This commitment
21 On the nature of these earlier reform projects in Nigeria, dubbed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), see Lewis "From prebendalism", above at note 14 at 80 and
82-85.
22 Id at 82-83.
23 Id at 83.
24 Ibid.
25 See P Mosley "Policy-making without facts: a note on the assessment of structural adjustment policies in Nigeria, 1985-1990" (1992) 91 African Affairs 227 at 228-30; and JO
Ihonvbere "Economic crisis, structural adjustment and social crisis in Nigeria" (1993)
21 World Development 141 at 143.

26 Mosley "Policy-making without facts", above at note 25, and Ihonvbere "Economic
crisis", above at note 25.
27 See id at 143-44.
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has been so solid that the IMF has recently felt able to endorse the
government's economic reform programme as "commendable". 28 The
government acknowledges this policy in its 2005 report to the World
Trade Organization's Trade Policy Review Body. 29 It has also expressed its
intention to retrench "up to 40% of the federal civil service" under its
policy of "right-sizing", and has made concrete moves to attain this
objective. 30 Although the government also intends to pursue the
privatization programme begun under previous SAP arrangements, the
rest of the paper focuses on the recent spate of fuel price increases and
the retrenchment of government workers as two key elements of the
current government's economic reform agenda. From the above discussion, the deep substantive connections between the SAP implemented
earlier in Nigeria and the current economic reform agenda are quite
clear.
The two historical phases of economic reform in Nigeria are also deeply
connected to each other in another important way: the nature of the
manoeuvres that the implementing regimes sought to make in their
attempt to sell these reforms in the face of widespread discontent and
resistance among the citizenry - resistance that was in each case harnessed
and channelled into a formidable grassroots opposition movement by a
labour-led civil society coalition. In both phases of reform, the relevant
governments "introduced orthodox measures of reform under a
nationalist guise". 31 This is easily illustrated. For example, speaking
recently to a joint session of the National Assembly, Nigeria's bi-cameral
parliament, president Obasanjo attempted to reinforce the government's
and
Economic Empowerment
National
position that Nigeria's
reform
Development Strategy (NEEDS) is a "home grown" economic
agenda that is significantly different from the usual IMF/WB SAPs. In his
own words:
"Let me state, once more, for those who say we did not get any relief or that
the terms were ambiguous, the debt relief for Nigeria is REAL! In fact, such
amount of write off by the Paris Club in terms of procedure and sequence is
unprecedented for a country that is not in chaos or that is not being
rewarded for offering strategic military support. And even then, the IMF
would insist on its own supervised programme to be put in place,
consisting of the usual stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes with implementation certified by the Fund before any debt relief
deal could be contracted. This was waived in favour of a Policy Support
28 See also IMF "Nigeria: 2005 article IV consultation" IMF Country Report No 05/302, 25
March 2005, at para 58.
29 See "Trade policy report review: report by Nigeria" WT/TPR/G/147, 13 April 2005, at
12.
30 See The Guardian (21 December 2003), available at: <htrp://www.dawodu.com/aluko75.
htm> (last accessed 26 September 2005).
31 See Lewis "From prebendalism", above at note 14 at 83.
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Instrument (PSI) as the NEEDS programme was considered good enough to

manage our efforts at repositioning our political economy for sustainable
growth" .32
The fact that the government seeks to make a distinction between earlier
SAPs and NEEDS is clear from the above passage. That the IMF has
participated in the attempt to sell NEEDS as significantly indigenous to
Nigerian economic thought is evidenced by that organization's recent
33
description of NEEDS as a "homegrown reform agenda".
Yet even a cursory analysis of earlier SAPs in Nigeria and the key elements
of the current NEEDS-driven reform programme shows that the measures
introduced in both cases mirror the quintessential requirements of the
kinds of IMF/WB SAPs that have been implemented around the world.3 4 As
noted above, fuel price increases (as deregulation of the downstream
petroleum sector) and the retrenchment of public sector employees to cut
costs were two key measures introduced by the Babangida regime under its
IMF/WB-inspired and supported "home grown" and SAP reform programmes. Both measures continue to constitute key elements of the
current government's NEEDS-driven approach to economic reform. A
second reason for the conclusion that NEEDS is not as significantly "home
grown" as is claimed is that, in terms of its philosophical orientation,
NEEDS "could pass as a World Bank [or IMF] reform program". 35 Indeed, as
Sam Amadi has noted, "a critical reading of the entire [NEEDS] document
shows that it still keeps faith with the broad framework of neo-liberal
market-oriented reform which [both] the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund strongly endorse". 36 Another such reason is the precipitate
endorsement of NEEDS by the IMF and WB,37 and their continued
endorsement of the NEEDS-driven civil service retrenchment or "rightsizing" and fuel price increases. 38 For example, as has been noted, not that
32 See 0 Obasanjo "Briefing to the National Assembly on the Report of the National
Political Reform Conference and recent debt relief granted to Nigeria" (26th July
2005), available at: <http://www.dawodu.com/obas42.htm> (last accessed 3 October
2005).
33 See IMF "Semi-annual staff report under intensified surveillance: Nigeria, 2004" IMF
Country Report No 05/37, February 2005, at 1.
34 For the nature of some of the SAPs implemented elsewhere, see S Kanga'ra "When the
pendulum swings too far: structural adjustment programs in Kenya" (1998-99) Third
World Legal Studies 109; and V Lloyd and R Weissman "Against the workers: how IMF and
World Bank Policies undermine labour power and policies" (2001) 22/9 Multinational
Monitor, available at: <http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2001l/1september/sepol
corpi.html> (last accessed 3 October 2005).
35 See S Amadi "Contextualizing NEEDS: political and economic development" in S Amadi
and F Ogwo (eds) Contextualizing NEEDS: Economic/Political Reform in Nigeria (2004,
HURIILAWS and CPPR) at 13.
36 Id at 12.
37 Id at 19.
38 See IMF "Semi-annual report", above at note 33 at 2,12, 9-10 and 22. See also IMF "Nigeria",
above at note 28 at paras 1, 6, 13 and 58.
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long ago, while recognizing some of the difficulties associated with it,
the IMF still endorsed the current government's overall economic reform
programme as "commendable". 39 It also described the retrenchment of
17,000 workers as "progress" in implementing Nigeria's economic reform
agenda. 40 A weaker but still important reason for the fidelity of NEEDS to
key tenets of earlier IMF/WB-inspired and supported reform measures
(especially in the area of the so-called removal of fuel subsidies) is the
intellectual connections and affiliations of most of the main authors of

that document to either the World Bank, the IMF, and/or to the Harvard
Business School that is seen by many as promoting IMF/WB-produced
conventional wisdom. 41 For example, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (the then
minister of finance) most recently served as a vice-president of the World
Bank; Professor Charles Soludo (one-time chief economic adviser to the
president and now the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria) has
served at and for the WB); Mallam Nasir El-Rufai (the chair of the
Presidential Reform Task Force on the implementation of the Reforms,
and minister in charge of the Federal Capital Territory) has taken courses
at the Harvard Business School; and Ms Obiageli Ezekwesili (one-time
senior assistant to the president, and now a serving minister and key
member of the government's economic team) trained at the Harvard
Business School. The government's economic management team works
closely with and is aligned with the IMF in the relevant respects. Such
intellectual affiliations and close (but clearly unequal) working relationships may explain in part why these key Nigerian actors have not
departed from the so-called international consensus on the tenets of
good socio-economic governance; a rather questionable consensus that is
too often discussed as if certain alternative socio-economic paths are
neither existent nor viable. In any case, the fuel price increases
implemented in Nigeria have, for the most part, been forced on the
current government by the IMFiWB. 42 What is more, the resident
representative of the IMF in Nigeria has spoken of his organization's
"close and cooperative relationship" with the current Obasanjo government, and has noted that the IMF and this government "share a common
43

vision for Nigeria".
As this article will show, given the similarity of the current reforms with
earlier IMF/WB SAPs in Nigeria, and the suffering that these measures have
39 See IMF "Nigeria", above at note 28 at para 58.

40 Id at para 6.
41 See Amadi, "Contextualizing NEEDS", above at note 35 at 18-19. It appears that similar
processes via which ideas produced either in global institutions or in Western states, or
in both, have percolated into "third world" states have also occurred with respect to
key Latin American countries. See Y Dezalay and BG Garth The Internationalizationof
Palace Wars (2002, University of Chicago Press) especially at 28-31, 45-47, 143-53, and
168-80.
42 For example, see S Olukoya "Nigeria's gas crisis: suffering in the midst of plenty" (14
May 2001) CorpWatch (on file with author).

43 See Moser, "The IMF and Nigeria", above at note 10.
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inflicted on Nigeria's poor majority, 44 the attempt to manoeuvre most
Nigerians into accepting the SAP and the current reform programmes by
portraying them as "home grown" failed. As such, this tactic did little to
placate either Nigeria's poor majority or the labour-led civil society
coalition that opposed the reforms, with the result that mass protests
and civil disobedience continued to dog the efforts of either government to
implement the said measures. This led in turn to the intensification of the
Obasanjo government's authoritarian and undemocratic attempts to
curtail labour rights and weaken the labour movement in Nigeria.
LABOUR-LED MASS RESISTANCE AND INTENSIFIED STATE
REPRESSION
As a result of their tendencies to neglect the interests of the poor majority
in countries under reform and the harsh impoverishment that they often
foster or augment, the implementation around the world of IMFWBinspired and supported SAPs (and such other economic reform programmes) has more often than not generated intense popular resistance
to the key measures that constitute these reform projects (such as the
removal of fuel and food subsidies, retrenchment of public sector workers,
etc).45 Faced with external pressures in the form of a pro-neo-liberal reform
coalition made up of the IMF/WB, their mostly Western creditors and
donor/rich states on the one hand, and internal pressures from widespread
and often intense labour-led opposition to the reforms on the other, the
response of many states under reform has often been to intensify both the
curtailment of certain rights and the repression of the anti-reform
46
opposition.
This was certainly the case in Nigeria in the mid-1980s to the late 1990s,
when successive military regimes, especially the Babangida junta, severely
curtailed labour rights and, despite the Nigerian labour movement's

44 For descriptions of the massive nature of this suffering, see Ihonvbere "Economic
Crisis", above at note 25 at 141. Ihonvbere correctly notes (at 141) that under the
Babangida and IMFJWB-imposed SAP, life became more difficult, if not impossible, for
the poor majority. Unemployment and inflation rose to unprecedented proportions.
Tensions between classes became heightened, and human rights violations and
political tensions came to characterize relations between state and society. The then
retired General Obasanjo was at the forefront of those who criticized the Babangida
regime for enforcing a steep increase in fuel prices that caused massive human
suffering in Nigeria between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. See Daily Independent
(26 November 2005), available at: <http:lwww.nigerianmuse.com/important-documents/
?u=ObasanjoTELLInterview_1993.htn> (last accessed 3 October 2005). See also M Ndulo
"The democratization process and structural adjustment in Africa" (2003) 10 Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies 315 at 363.
45 See Ihonvbere "Economic crisis", above at note 25 at 142.
46 See B Beckman "Empowerment or repression? The World Bank and the politics of adjustment" in Y Bangura, P Gibbon and A Ofstad (eds) Authoritarianism, Democracy and
Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa (1992, The Scandinavian Institute of
African Studies) 83 at 93.
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gallant resistance, succeeded in weakening that movement's capacity to
mobilize mass opposition to the SAP project of the time. Opposition to the
Babangida regime's reforms in part led to coups in 1986 and 1990. 4 7 It also
led to massive labour movement-led demonstrations and riots by workers,
students, market women and the unemployed. 48 As Ihonbvere points out,
the widespread opposition threatened the government's grip on power and
its claim to legitimacy and forced it to abandon its human rights
pretensions and become openly repressive. 49 The Academic Staff Union of
Universities (ASUU) was proscribed and labour leaders belonging to the
Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), ASUU and other trades unions, were
routinely harassed and detained. 50 Student union anti-SAP protests were
harshly suppressed, university campuses were closed, anti-SAP gatherings
were forcibly disbanded, and the harassment of the independent press
intensified.51 In 1988, when conservative and radical elements clashed
within the NLC, the Babangida regime quickly seized what it saw as a golden
opportunity to neutralize the labour-led opposition to the SAP and ousted
the national officers of the NLC. 5 2 It then proceeded to appoint a sole
administrator to oversee the NLC's affairs, and thereafter supervised an
election that installed a union leadership, led by Pascal Bafyau, who Peter
53
Lewis has charitably described as "more moderate".
While it will be a serious mistake to simply equate the Obasanjo-led
civilian government with the "bare-knuckle dictatorship" that characterized the later years of the Babangida regime and the entire tenure of the
Abacha junta, the response of the Obasanjo government to the labour-led
mass opposition to the implementation of key aspects of its economic
reform agenda has not been so different. Given the Obasanjo government's
incessant rhetoric in favour of political liberalization and its practice of a
form of quasi-democracy, one might have expected to observe a largely
democratic response to this labour-led opposition. Yet, while Obasanjo's
response in this particular respect has been relatively mild compared with
that of the Babangida and Abacha regimes, it has been quite harsh
nevertheless, as illustrated by the current government's curtailment of
labour rights and its attempts to weaken the labour movement in the face
of labour-led mass resistance (through popular action, general strikes, press
campaigns, and international appeals) to the fuel price hikes and
retrenchment measures of 1999-2005.
Almost from the very beginning of its current tenure in office, and with
the exception of a short period just before the 2003 elections, the Obasanjo
government showed a determination (under much pressure from a
47
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See Ihonvbere "Economic crisis", above at note 25 at 144.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Ihonvbere "A critical evaluation", above at note 16 at 610.
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troubled Nigerian economy, the IMF/WB and the rich creditor states and
corporations) to raise fuel prices to "international levels" and retrench a
huge chunk of Nigeria's public service work force. However, almost all of
the general strikes and mass resistance that the government has faced have
been as a result of the fuel price hikes that it has enforced in the face of the
growing impoverishment of most Nigerians. As such, the illustration here
of labour-led mass resistance and the government's curtailment of labour
rights and repression of that oppositional campaign will focus on the fuel
price question.
Between June 2000 and October 2004, the Obasanjo regime increased the
price of fuel by roughly 184 per cent.5 4 Subsequent hikes in late 2004 and in
2005 brought the margin of the total increase since the year 2000 to as high
as 250 per cent by 26 August 2005.55 By the credible account of Lagos state
governor, Bola Tinubu, there were more than ten such fuel hikes between
June 2000 and August 2005.56 Yet, during this same period, incomes

remained largely stagnant or even decreased in real terms for most
ordinary Nigerians. Also according to Tinubu: "the level of poverty in the
country today is...unacceptable ...There is nothing more heart-rending than
hearing the teeming masses of our people cry daily that they are worse off
economically and socially today than they were before the democratic
restoration of 1999".

57

While the Obasanjo government has on occasion partly rescinded or
delayed portions of these price increases as a concession to the labour-led
opposition coalition, it has in the end pressed on in the direction of
such sharp increases. Every time the government has levied such
increases, the labour-led coalition has tended to respond in a number
of ways. First, it attempts to open dialogue with the government or
persuade it to rescind the increases. It then lobbies the legislature,
mounts targeted press campaigns, makes focused international appeals,
and issues public warnings to the government. However, it has almost
always resorted in the end to organizing general strikes and mass rallies
in an attempt to force the government to meet its demands (however
partially).
In response to the first increase of fuel prices announced in June 2000 by
the Obasanjo government, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) led one of
the most crippling and effective general strikes since the end of military
rule in Nigeria. Oil workers joined public sector and transportation workers
54 See "Report of the meeting held by the Senate Committee on Employment, Labour and
Productivity with stakeholders on the recent increases in the pump prices of
petroleum products and the threat of a nationwide strike by [the] NLC and civil

society groups", available at: <http:iiwww.nlcng.org/october2O04strike/senate%2Ocommittee%2Oreporton962Oprice%2Ohike.htm> (last accessed 4 October 2005) at 3.
55 See This Day (4 September 2005), available at: <http://www.allafrica.comlstories/2005/
200509050448.html> (last accessed 23 September 2005).
56 See The Vanguard (15 September 2005), available at: <http:lallafrica.com/stories/printable/
200509150166.html> (last accessed 19 September 2005).

57 Ibid.
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in ensuring the success of the strike.5 8 Nigeria's main seaport in Lagos and

highways were blockaded.5 9 International and domestic air flights were
disrupted, and all fuel stations were closed. 60 Sporadic police and protester
violence was reported across the country and two police stations in the
61
federal capital territory, Abuja, were burned down by irate mobs.
The government was forced to back down from almost all of its announced
fuel price increases (that is from N20 to N30 and then back to N22 per
62
litre).
In January 2002, following that month's increase in fuel prices, the NLC
again mobilized Nigeria's poor majority and civil society groups by calling a
general strike that resulted in the closure of markets, fuel stations and
banks, effectively bringing the country to a standstill for at least a day. 63 The
strike was inconclusive, however, as the NLC was forced to suspend the
strike after the government obtained an injunction from an Abuja High
64
Court declaring it illegal.
The NLC and its allies put up stronger resistance in June 2003 to that
month's fuel price increase. 65 After its calls for dialogue with the
government were basically ignored by the executive branch (although
deeply respected by the legislature and supported somewhat by some in
the ruling party), the NLC launched and led another paralyzing strike
from 30 June 2003 that eventually lasted eight days. In response, the
government partially rescinded that fuel price increase. 66 However, true
to its modus operandi, it later raised the prices back to their pre-strike
levels.
In February 2004, the NLC called another such strike, but suspended it
when a court, after an approach from the government, ordered both sides
to maintain the status quo before the strike. This order meant that the
67
government had to order fuel marketers to reverse their price increases.
The government publicly did so, but did precious little to enforce this
directive. 68 It took a failed NLC-government dialogue and another three-day

58 See J Woodroffe and M Ellis-Jones "World development movement report", available at:
<http://www.wdm.org.uk/campaigns/cambriefs/debt/unrest.pdf> (last accessed 3
October 2005) at 11.
59 ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 See: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/782242.stm> (last accessed 3 October
2005).
63 See: <http://www.socialistalternative.org/literature/nigeria/ch6.html> (last accessed 3
October 2005).
64 Ibid.
65 See NLC "Report on the Fuel Price Strike 2003", available at: <http://www.nlcng.org
legislative/reportofthefuelstrike.htm> (last accessed 3 October 2005) at 1 and 5.
66 Id at 5. See also: <http://www.marxist.com/Africa/nig-strikelessons0703.html> (last
accessed 3 October 2005).
67 See: <http://www.afrol.com/articles/13333> (last accessed 3 October 2005).
68 Ibid.
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strike in June 2004 for the government to get the marketers to comply
69
substantially with this court order.
The NLC and its allies also called a four-day warning strike in October
2004, and another general strike in November 2004, in order to press the
government to reverse yet another increase in the price of fuel. 70 The
October strike brought much of the country to a standstill, but did not
extract any significant concession from the government. 71 This was so
despite the fact that the government had obtained a ruling from Justice
Roseline Ukeje, the chief judge of the Federal High Court, holding that
the NLC could not in effect organize strikes over fuel price increases (as
this was, in her view, not a matter within the purview of collective
bargaining for workers' conditions of service).7 2 The court also held that
the NLC in itself could not call a strike; only its constituent unions
could. 73 The NLC did not hesitate to call another general strike in
November of that same year. However, before the November strike could
begin fully, the government averted it by first cutting the price of
kerosene and later announcing a partial reversal of the price of (petrol)
74

fuel.

While the NLC has been forced to organize numerous general strikes and
has won a number of concessions from the government as a result, it has
recently changed its tactics, perhaps in tentative response to the court
ruling discussed above. This change of tactic came to the fore in September
2005, when the NLC announced a sustained mass action campaign initially
consisting of two weeks of peaceful demonstrations and rallies across
Nigeria. 75 These rallies attracted a massive attendance. 76 In Lagos, for
example, a mammoth crowd was mobilized that, at a point, stretched for
nearly three kilometres. 77 The NLC president, Adams Oshiomole, the
Catholic archbishop of Lagos, Olubunmi Okogie, the Nobel prize winner
Wole Soyinka, and the governor of Lagos state, Bola Tinubu, all addressed
this rally. A general strike in October 2005 was not ruled out. 78 These rallies
were the first government sanctioned protests in Nigeria in forty years.
Earlier protests had occurred in spite of the government's attempts to

69 Ibid.
70 See The Vanguard (12 October 2004), available at: <http://www.nlcng.org/october2004
strike/fromthepress/workersobeyNLC12102004.htm> (last accessed 3 October 2005).
71 See: <http:/news.bbc.co.uk/l/hilbusiness/4013099.stm> (last accessed 3 October 2005).
72 See Federal Government of Nigeria and another v Oshiomole and Nigeria Labour Congress Suit
No FHCIABJICSI5212004, Abuja Division of the Federal High Court of Nigeria, 21
September 2004, per R Ukeje, CJ (on file with author) at 23-26. Herein after referred to
as "the Ukeje Ruling".
73 Id at 30 and 32.
74 See: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hilbusiness/4013099.stm> (last accessed 8October 2005).
75 See: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/worldlafrica/4244556.stm> (last accessed 3 October
2005).
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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repress them but, in this case, the police were explicitly ordered not to carry
any weapons and not to disrupt the protest rallies. 79 However, this is not to
say that no lives were lost during and as a result of this round of protests.
Two civil society activists, the then CLO executive director, Chima Ubani,
and the photo-journalist Tunji Oyeleru, both lost their lives in an accident
while travelling to one such rally.80
Stung by the obvious popularity of the labour-led mass campaigns
opposing its fuel price hike policy, the Obasanjo government has sought to
defuse the negative effects on its popular legitimacy by attempting to limit,
contain or stop entirely these general strikes. To this end, it has made use of
public appeals, obtained court rulings, and unleashed - or at least largely
tolerated - the harassment, assaults, detentions and killings perpetrated by
the police on labour and allied activists/protesters. Specific examples of
police brutality in response to labour-led anti-reform protests will serve to
illustrate this point. In 1999, in anticipation of the June 2000 increase in the
price of fuel, the NLC led over five thousand workers on a march on Aso
Rock, the seat of Nigeria's presidency, to protest this action.8 1 These
82
unarmed protesters were brutally attacked and assaulted by armed police.
The June 2000 strikes were so widely supported, not just by the poor
majority and the labour-led civil society coalition, but also by most in the
National Assembly and among the political classes, that the government did
83
not attempt to use as much police violence to repress it as it could have.
The January 2002 strike was, by contrast, brutally repressed by the police.
Adams Oshiomole, the then NLC president, and ten other union
activists were arrested and charged in court with "organizing an illegal
strike". 84 Approximately 20 and 16 NLC leaders were arrested and detained
in Kaduna and Port Harcourt, respectively. The police repeated, and in fact
intensified, this same pattern of brutality and repression during the June
2003 general strike. Nationwide, more than 16 people were killed by police
officers and dozens more were brutally assaulted. 85 The February and June
2004 strikes were also met with incidents of police suppression.8 6 Much of
this suppression was justified on the basis that protesters needed the prior
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permission of the police in order to demonstrate. The police also attempted
to suppress the October 2004 strike in similar ways. For example, during
this strike, armed police officers paraded the streets, the police forcibly
prevented the NLC from staging a protest rally, 30 student protesters were
wounded in lbadan, 14 protesters were arrested in Kaduna, and nine labour
leaders were arrested in Awka.8 7 In November of that same year, the labourled coalition called off their planned strike at the last minute when the
government partially backed down on that round of increases in the price
of fuel.88 As such, the government's attempt to intimidate the labour-led
coalition and frustrate this particular strike was more or less limited to
rejecting the NLCs application for a police permit to hold protest
processions (the Nigerian Police Force is controlled in every sense of that
word by the Federal Government).8 9 However, as has been noted earlier in
this section, the government's response to the September 2005 anti-fuel
price hike protest rallies was far more civil than it previous responses to
anti-reform protests.
Perhaps the government has finally begun a process of coming to terms
with the democratic rights of Nigeria's poor majority and the labour-led
civil society coalition that mass mobilizes them in resistance against the
government's IMF/WB inspired and supported reform agenda. Or perhaps
the government's new found tolerance of labour rallies, if such a thing can
even be said to exist at this point, is linked to the fact that strikes, more
than rallies, are far more threatening to its political and economic power.
Alternatively, it may be connected to the fact that the government has now
secured a court order that ostensibly outlaws the NLC's ability to call strikes
in own right,90 and has also pushed through legislation that seeks to
weaken significantly the labour-led coalition's capacity to force the
government to rescind its highly unpopular reform measures, such as fuel
price increases, by paralyzing economic and social activities in the
country. 91
This new legislation amends the Trade Unions Act of Nigeria and other
allied legislation. 92 In effect, it limits the scope of the subject-matter or
issues over which labour unions and the NLC (or some other "central
labour organization") can call a strike; bars strikes in so-called essential
services; sets stringent preconditions for strikes; allows for the creation of
other central labour organizations apart from the NLC; and bars the
picketing of airports or public highways to obstruct air or motor vehicular

87 See The Vanguard (12 October 2004), above at note 70.
88 See: <http:/www.afrol.com/articles/14814> (last accessed 21 June 2006).

89 See: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/inequalfLabour/lO18survey.pdf> (last accessed
21 June 2006).

90 See the Ukeje Ruling, above at note 72.
91 See the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005, available at: <http:/twww.nigeria-law.org/
TradeUiion(Amendment)Act2005.htm> (last accessed 23 September 2005).

92 See the Trade Unions Act, Cap 437, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990; Decree No 4
of 1996; and Decree No 26 of 1996.
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traffic. While the last two measures are open to debate as to their
appropriateness in the Nigerian context, the other measures are almost
certainly undemocratic; are a violation of labour/political rights to freedom
of association, to freedom of expression, and to call strikes; and are in
general anti-labour. For example, under the new act, unions can only
declare a strike if it concerns a "dispute of right" (that is, one arising
directly from a collective agreement).93 As such, strikes against fuel price
hikes are presumably now outlawed under the new act. There is no good
legal or moral reason why the members of a labour union should not have
the same right as other citizens to protest collectively any government
policy that significantly affects them. Also health, education and other
"essential workers" (as defined under the Trade Disputes Act 94 ) are
essentially barred from ever declaring a strike.9 5 Again, no union can
declare a strike unless a simple majority of all union members vote in
96
favour (not simply a majority of those who are present and voting).
As anti-labour as the final legislation may seem, the original bill
submitted to the National Assembly by the Obasanjo government, 97 on
which the final law is based, had proposed to ban or frustrate strikes
altogether by providing that employers who deduct union dues from the
wages of its unionized workers should only remit that sum to the relevant
union if that union had agreed to a so-called "no strike" clause in its
collective agreement with the employer. 98 This government bill also
provided that a two-thirds majority of union members must vote in favour
of a strike before a union could declare a strike. 99 The bill would also have
mandated the Registrar of Trade Unions to "remove from the register the
Nigeria Labour Congress as the only Central Labour Organization in
Nigeria". 1 00
However, under great pressure from the labour-led coalition and the
Nigerian public, the National Assembly watered down significantly the bill's
harsh proposals. The National Assembly made three major and highly
consequential amendments to the original bill: to expunge from it the
proposal to ban strikes; to reduce the number of votes required for a union
to declare a strike from a two-thirds to a simple majority; and to expunge
the mandate imposed on the Registrar of Trade Unions to de-register
the NLC as the only central labour organization in Nigeria (so that the
NLC does not now have to re-apply to be registered as a central labour
organization).

93
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See the Trade Union (Amendment) Act, above at note 91 at sec 6.
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See the Trade Union (Amendment) Act, above at note 91 at sec 6.

ibid.
See A Bill for an Act to Amend the Trade Unions Act as Amended and for Matters
Connected Therewith (on file with author).
98
Id at sec 3.
99
Id at sec 5.
100 Id at sec 6.

85

86

JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW

VOL 51, NO i

Yet, despite the government's seemingly lofty claims that the new act was
intended to "entrench sanity and decent behaviour in the manner in which
strikes are conducted" and that it "only seeks to create a labour friendly
environment" in line with International Labour Standards, 10' it is clear
from a combination of the original proposals made to the National
Assembly by the Executive branch, the actual content of the new act, and
the nature of the labour movement's historical engagement with the
government, that the measures introduced were designed to curtail labour
rights and weaken the labour-led coalition that forms the main opposition
to aspects of the economic reform project of the Obasanjo government.
How, one might ask, is an outright ban on strikes or the imposition of
stringent pre-conditions for strikes an attempt to regulate the manner in
which strikes are conducted or to create a labour-friendly environment?
Overall it must be noted that the pattern of repression and curtailment of
rights that is noticeable from the above account of the government's
responses to labour's widely popular struggle against its fuel price increases
fits seamlessly into a broader picture of semi-autocratic rule and poor
human rights performance under the current Obasanjo regime. Although
much euphoria marked the end of military rule and heralded Obasanjo's
inauguration as Nigeria's president in 1999, hopes for improved human
rights under his leadership have yet to be realized.10 2 This conclusion is
supported by the report issued by Human Rights Watch (HRW) on the state
of human rights in Nigeria in 2005.103 Although the US and other Western
governments continue to deal with the Obasanjo regime as a key friend and
ally and/or as if it were a more human rights-friendly regime, the negative
impression conveyed in this HRW report is also supported by every human
rights report issued by the Labor and Human Rights Section of the US
Department of State since at least 2001.104 From a seriously flawed election
in 2003, to the massacres perpetrated in the Niger Delta and the Benue
regions by the army, this regime's overall human rights record has
"remained poor".105
Given the fact that the elected quasi-democratic Obasanjo regime has
exhibited a broad semi-autocratic bent, it becomes apparent that the
labour-led popular struggle against its reform project did not simply create
101 See: <http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=13450> (last accessed 5 October
2005).
102 See Aka "Nigeria since May 1999", above at note 16 at 211.
103 See: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/nigeriaO7O5/l.htm> (last accessed 26 September
2005).
104 See US Department of State "Country reports on human rights practices-2004: Nigeria",
available at: <http:iiwww.state.gov/g/drl/rlslhrrpt/2004/41620.htm> (last accessed 26
September 2005); id "2003 Report", available at: <http://www.state.gov/g/drI/rls/hrrpt/
2003/27743.htm> (last accessed 26 September 2005); id "2002 Report", available at:
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18220.htm> (last accessed 26 September
2005); id "2001 Report", available at: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/afI
8397.htm> (last accessed 26 September 2005).
105 See id "2004 Report" at 1.
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autocratic instincts or behaviour within this regime. However, this labourled resistance movement led to the intensification of particular forms of
government repression targeted at those who launched the street protests
and general strikes that demonstrated the scale of the opposition to the
highly unpopular aspects of its reform programme. It is, therefore, only
logical to conclude that, worried about the power that labour wielded in
Nigeria and intent on prosecuting its IMF/WB-backed reforms, the Obasanjo
regime singled out labour rights for curtailment and attempted to weaken
the labour movement.
However, neither the unfavourable general human rights climate under
the Obasanjo regime nor that government's targeted attempts to curtail
labour rights and weaken the labour movement has succeeded so far in
cowing, de-mobilizing, or suppressing the labour-led coalition's resistance
to the government's unpopular fuel price hikes. Given the long history of
labour-led resistance against far more dictatorial regimes, 10 6 the suppression of labour organizations by Obasanjo's semi-autocratic elected
government was, in any case, a highly unlikely outcome. Prior to
September 2005, the labour-led coalition had succeeded in winning a
number of concessions from the government, especially in terms of
significantly delaying or reversing fuel price increases. This trend is likely
to continue because, despite the labour-led coalition's preference for
rallies (as opposed to general strikes) as its initial response to the August/
September 2005 fuel price hikes, it should be noted that the coalition
has not ruled out resort to one or more general strikes should the
government fail to reverse the latest round of hikes. Clearly, therefore, the
coalition is prepared to engage in, on the face of it, illegal strike actions,
presumably as a form of civil disobedience. What is more, President
Obasanjo's attempt in his 1 October 2005 Independence Day speech to
placate the labour organizations is clear evidence of their continued
capacity to exert significant pressure on the government.10 7 In that
speech, Obasanjo announced that there would be no further fuel price
hikes until the end of 2006 whatever the cost of crude oil or imported fuel
in the international market. In his own words:
"Itis relevant and important to note that there is still a substantial level of
subsidy in the petroleum products supplied to the domestic market today
in spite of the recent price adjustments. However, what is important at this
point in time is to ensure that continued rising price in the international
market of crude oil does not continue to translate to further price increases
of products at the pump. For this reason Government has directed PPPRA,
NNPC and other stakeholders to work out the Modulator Mechanism that

106 See Ihonvbere "A critical evaluation", above at note 16 at 608.
107 See 0 Obasanjo "2005 Independence Day speech", available at: <http://www.nigerianmuse.
com/important _documents/?u-= ObasanjoindependencespeechOctober1__2005.htm>
(last accessed 5 October 2005).
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will maintain and sustain current pump price level until the end of 2006 no
08
matter what happens in the internationaloil market".

This is a very significant concession given that, despite Nigeria's status as
one of the world's largest oil-producing countries, much of the refined fuel
consumed in Nigeria is now imported. Thus, in effect, Obasanjo was
announcing, as a concession to the labour-led coalition, a huge subsidy on
the cost of imported fuel. This is a policy that conflicts squarely with his
government's long-term policy of petroleum sector deregulation and the
complete removal of the subsidy on fuel. As has been shown above, the
removal of this subsidy is a key component of the government's IMF/WB
supervised economic reform programme. As importantly, in the same
speech, Obasanjo promised that, "through on-going discussions with
Labour, Government will work out some adjustments in allowances to cushion

the effect of increased fuel price". 10 9 This is further evidence of the kind of
influence that the labour-led coalition still exerts on the government in
Nigeria. It also shows that, as autocratic as it has been and as poor as its
human rights record has been, the Obasanjo regime is still far from an
outright dictatorship.
Still, it is important to note that, as well-documented as the Obasanjo
government's poor human rights record is, the regime has so far remained
near-immune from the kind of criticism and ostracism that has been meted
out to some other third world leaders whose behaviour has not been all
that different. Having conducted and won an election in 2003 that has been
described by the US State Department as "fraudulent", and having been
identified as responsible for extensive and recurrent abuses of human rights
(including labour rights), the politically naive observer might have expected
that the Obasanjo government would have by now faced some meaningful
international criticism (and perhaps even mild sanctions). Yet, for the most
part, such criticisms and sanctions have so far not been forthcoming.
Why, then, has this particular regime seemingly received a virtual
international pass for its significantly poor human rights record? One of
the many reasons that can be identified is that the Obasanjo regime has on
the whole been a strategic and key economic and political partner of the
key Western interests involved: the IMF/WB, and the US/British governments. A dimension of this specific reason may be the fact that Obasanjo
has faithfully implemented the key aspects of the market liberalizationbased economic reform agenda favoured by the IMF/WB and these key
Western governments. Such reforms have benefited, or are likely to benefit,
some key Western oil corporations, bankers and investors. While certain
Western interests, such as their own labour unions, may not benefit
significantly from, and may even oppose, the implementation of these IMF/
WB-style policies in third world countries like Nigeria, many other Western
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
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actors (for example, certain oil corporations and their investors and
bankers) often profit and benefit tremendously (be it directly or indirectly)
from the access to local markets, sale of local refineries and increases in the
prices of fuel sold locally by the oil marketing multinationals. For instance,
by refusing for the last several years to build refineries in the country (and
thereby alleviate Nigeria's very serious refined motor fuel scarcity problem)
and by their reluctance to buy over and manage the existing governmentrun plants, ExonMobil, Chevron, Shell, Elf, AGIP and Texaco have helped put
great pressure of the Obasanjo regime to raise fuel prices drastically. 110
Clearly, aside from their other "justifications", the sharp increases in the
price of fuel during the period under study not only serve to benefit these
oil corporations in their traditional role as distributors and marketers of
refined fuel within Nigeria, but will also make it more profitable for them to
invest in and operate refineries in the country. As such, it could be said,
adapting Rhoda Howard's now famous phrase, that the need for more and
more "full bellies" in the West has in part led to a willingness among many
Western governments and the IMF/WB to overlook the poor human rights
record of regimes that seem to be dedicated to pursuing policies that
further the objective of providing markets and profits for rich-country
actors to a significant extent.

THE NEW "FULL BELLY THESIS" AND THE SUBSTITUTION OF
IDEOLOGY
It seems that both the curtailment of labour rights in order to weaken the
power of the labour organizations in Nigeria, and the virtual silence of key
Western governments regarding these types of human rights violations, are
largely grounded in deliberate or more unconscious adherence to a kind of
"full belly thesis"."' As Howard understands it, the full belly thesis asserts
that the struggle to implement the economic and social rights of a mostly
poor population should take priority over or trump the full enjoyment of
certain civil and political rights. 2 In the case of the implementation of
IMF/WB-style economic reforms by the Obasanjo government, and the
labour rights' curtailments and violations that the implementation of this
agenda has entailed, the government's implied full belly thesis is that the
exercise of certain labour rights (such as the right to call general strikes)
and the considerable socio-political power exercised by the labour
movement in Nigeria pose serious obstacles to the implementation of a
reform agenda that the government seems to believe will uplift the
economy and ensure the enjoyment of economic and social rights by most
Nigerians, and should as such be curtailed, perhaps on a temporary basis.
110 See: <http:/www.afrol.com/articles/10668> (last accessed 21 June 2006).
111 See R Howard "The Full Belly Thesis: should economic rights take priority over civil
and political rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa" (1983) 5 Human Rights
Quarterly 467.
112 Idat 468.
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Similarly, the implied full belly thesis of the IMFIWB and the key Western
governments is that these labour rights can be sacrificed, perhaps on a
temporary basis, in the broader economic interest of both the Nigerian
people and the world economy (which is controlled in large measure by
Western governments, corporations and peoples). Both arguments accord
priority to the struggle for certain broad economic rights over the
enjoyment of certain labour rights. Each of them is, therefore, a kind of
full belly thesis.
The fact that deliberate or more unconscious adherence to a full belly
thesis provides the grounds for the Obasanjo government's curtailment of
labour rights and its attempts to weaken the power of labour in Nigeria,
and the fact that Western criticism of these measures has been basically
muted, confirms the anxieties that have long been expressed regarding the
human rights tensions that are often made manifest when third world
countries undertake IMF/WB-style economic adjustment alongside their
transitions to democratic rule. 113 It also reflects the mostly inappropriate
ways in which the relevant governments and the IMF/WB seek to resolve
such human rights tensions. To these key actors, the fuller exercise of
labour and certain other rights has too often been viewed as an obstacle to
free trade, liberalized third world domestic markets, and profits. For
example, the IMF has described the Nigerian economy as "vulnerable to
social and political risks visible in the recent labour strikes".114 The
enjoyment of the right to strike in Nigeria (and some other pre-existing key
labour rights) is thus monolithically constructed as a vulnerability, a risk,
and a weak link in the struggle for economic development, and something
that Nigeria needs to overcome if it is to make any progress on that front
and therefore secure the economic and social rights of its citizens. In the
face of the Obasanjo government's obvious failure to persuade most
Nigerians and the labour-led coalition of the soundness of its fuel price hike
policy, the curtailment of labour (and other human) rights and the
diminishing of the labour-led coalition's capacity to exert pressure on the
government to rescind these policies was, quite unfortunately, seen by
the government and some international actors as the path to economic
progress.
It is, of course, true that the transition to democracy in Nigeria and
elsewhere cannot succeed unless the relevant economic conditions improve
and there is greater enjoyment of economic and social rights among the
relevant general population. 1H5 Yet, as is now known from the UN's position
on the "interdependence and indivisibility" of all categories of human
113 See Nelson "The politics of long-haul economic reform", above at note 1 at 15.
114 See IMF "Semi-annual report", above at note 33 at 14.
115 See M Ndulo "The democratization process and structural adjustment in Africa"
(2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 315 at 367. See also SC Agbakwa
"Reclaiming humanity: economic, social, and cultural rights as the cornerstone of
African human rights" (2002) 5 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 177
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rights (be they economic/social or civil/political), 116 the enjoyment of basic
civil/political rights (such as the labour rights that now stand curtailed in
terms of the texts of Nigerian law) is necessary for sustainable and equitable
11 7
economic development (as opposed to mere economic growth) to occur.
If, as the World Bank has recently shown, "within-country" and "global"
inequities are key obstacles to economic development in third world states,
then the equitable distribution of resources among a country's population
is also necessary for such development to occur. 1 18 Real and meaningful
popular participation, enabled by the exercise of basic civil/political rights,
in the shaping of economic reform agendas is key to ensuring that
economic policies lead to an equitable distribution among the population
of the available resources of that country. As is often the case, the economic
policies that are appropriate to a particular society cannot be properly
identified and implemented by relying solely on the technocratic wisdom of
either the IMF/WB, the government in question, or both.
In the Nigerian case, the sustained exercise by the labour-led coalition of
its right to call general strikes and mobilize the general population in street
demonstrations and other forms of protest, has been key to ensuring that
the government has been forced to respond, albeit grudgingly and in
trickles, to some of the more distributional needs of Nigeria's vast
economic underclass. As shown above, in response to the massive exercise
of the protest rights of the labour organizations, the government has on
occasion reversed its fuel price increases, announced moratoria on price
increases, and/or increased public sector salaries and allowances. While
these measures are at best insufficient to alleviate the poverty of Nigeria's
poor majority and bring their standards of living closer to those enjoyed by
a tiny minority of rich Nigerians, given the evidence considered in this
paper, even these inadequate measures would likely not have been
announced and implemented without the labour-led struggle that forced
the government's hand. And the labour organizations would not have been
able to lead such a struggle so effectively without being able to exercise the
very labour rights that the government has so stridently sought to curtail.
Thus, the argument that labour rights should be curtailed and the labour
movement weakened in order to facilitate the reforms that are intended to
usher in a golden age of economic development in Nigeria are largely
misguided. The implied full belly thesis that has grounded the reactions of
both the Obasanjo government and key Western actors to the labour-led
campaign against the implementation of key aspects of these reforms is just
as misguided.
This specific kind of full belly thesis is hardly distinguishable from the
old-style full belly thesis identified by Howard in 1983.119 The old full belly
116 See Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 25 June 1993, 32 ILM 1661.
117 See Howard "The Full Belly Thesis", above at note 111 at 470.
118 See The World Bank Equity and Development (2005, The World Bank) at 4 (of overview)
and 206 (of the main report).
119 Howard "The Full Belly Thesis", above at note 111.
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thesis that was proposed in the past by many third world governments
posited that some human rights ought to be sacrificed (to some extent) in
favour of the broad economic development of the country in question
which was to be achieved though the pursuit of import substitution-based
economic policies. These policies tended to impose barriers on the import
into these third world countries of foreign (especially Western) manufactured goods. The version of this thesis that we are confronted with today,
what I will henceforth refer to as "the new full belly thesis", contends that
the relevant third world governments should be able to sacrifice certain
human rights (to some extent) so as to facilitate the implementation of the
IMF/WB-driven market liberalization-based economic development policies
of these regimes. These IMF/WB-driven economic policies tend, inter alia, to
dictate the opening of the markets of these countries to goods manufactured abroad (especially in the West).
In the first type of full belly thesis, the curtailment of human rights
served an economic policy agenda that imposed obstacles to mostly
Western foreign product/capital imports into the relevant third world
countries, and did therefore depress economic growth/profits in the mostly
Western capital/product exporting countries. In the second kind of full
belly thesis, the curtailment of human rights is intended to serve an
economic policy agenda that favours mostly Western foreign product/
capital imports into the relevant third world states, and is therefore
intended to boost economic growth/profits in these mostly Western foreign
countries.
Yet, the new full belly thesis has, in effect, been better received than the
first kind of full belly thesis - at least in relation to their deployments at
various times in the Nigerian context. African states that proposed the old
fully belly thesis in the 1970s and 1980s were almost always condemned as,
at best, misguided. 120 Yet, in relation to its current deployment of the new
full belly thesis, no key Western country has subjected Nigeria to the kinds
of scathing criticism that have been meted out to some other countries that
similarly violate human rights. This is not to argue that Nigeria has not been
criticized at all for human rights violations, but to suggest that such
criticism has not matched its rather disappointing record, especially in the
labour rights area. Indeed, as seen above, the Obasanjo regime is frequently
portrayed as a good economic and political partner of the West.
What is apparent from this consideration of the evidence is that
international condemnation for proposing or practising the full belly
thesis seems to depend on the ideology that grounds the particular full
belly thesis that is put forward by the relevant government. If that ideology
matches IMF/WB economic policies and favours Western economic growth/
profits, the country is likely to receive more of a pass on its record of labour
rights violations than if that ideology is not in tune with IMF/WB policies
and does not favour Western economic growth/policies as much. As such,
120 Ibid.
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the substitution of one such ideology for the other can lead to more or less
favourable verdicts on a third world country's handling of the human
(especially labour) rights tensions that arise from an attempt to undertake a
dual political and economic transition. Thus, as the evidence shows, there
does not seem to be any commitment to the protection of interdependent
and indivisible human rights that can be abstracted from the broader
political economy or ideological context in which that commitment is
formed or expressed.
Thus, a seamlessly and optimally dual transition of the kind now being
undertaken in Nigeria and other similarly situated states is very difficult to
achieve given the specific content of the economic reform agenda that the
IMF/WB have persuaded or coerced these countries to adopt and implement, and the massive opposition that is often generated by attempts to
implement these policies. As the Nigerian case has shown, certain civil/
political rights, especially those that facilitate the exercise of power by the
labour-led coalitions that have mounted a sustained opposition to these
policies and by the poor majority in the country, are far-too-often sacrificed
or curtailed in the drive to implement these economic reforms. Yet,
without the substantial guarantee of the practical enjoyment of these
human rights, the democratic credentials of a country will remain suspect
in the eyes of most human rights scholars and activists, even if not in the
eyes of the IMF/WB or key Western regimes. Such third world governments
will be more properly seen as, at best, quasi-democratic regimes. Thus, no
matter how much a government's economic reform agenda succeeds in
fostering one form or the other of economic development, there can be no
successful dual transition without the political transition succeeding. In any
case, equitable economic development is almost impossible in the absence
of the meaningful enjoyment of the kinds of political rights that the
Nigerian labour movement has claimed and that the Nigerian government
has stridently sought to curtail.
To be clear though, the point that has been made in this section is not
that the old full belly thesis was correct when it was proposed. Any full belly
thesis whatsoever must be subjected to rigorous and sceptical examination.
It may well be (although it is not necessarily conceded) that certain not so
basic civil/political rights can in some cases be balanced away by a proven
and overwhelming national economic emergency. However, this case study
of the Nigerian context shows that the particular full belly thesis that is
asserted by the Obasanjo regime and its foreign economic allies and backers
is not justified by a rigorous assessment of the evidence. How can the
government's strident attempts to curtail labour rights so as to weaken the
labour movement's capacity to lead the popular resistance to aspects of its
economic reforms justify the intimidation, harassment, arrests, detentions,
and even killings, of some protesters and labour leaders? How can this end
possiblyjustify its (failed) attempt to ban all strikes by the NLC? And how (in
a supposed democracy) can its economic development ambitions possibly
justify its relatively successful move to impose stringent pre-conditions for
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strikes and divide the labour movement? These are policies that are mostly
associated with authoritarian (and not democratic) regimes.

CONCLUSION
This paper has utilized a Nigerian case study to show how the curtailment
of labour rights and the weakening of the labour movement has formed an
important part of the economic strategy of many of the third world
governments that are, for one reason or the other, intent on prosecuting an
IMF/WB and Western government-backed package of economic reforms. The
paper also shows that this curtailment of labour rights and the attempts to
weaken the labour-led coalition that has formed the vanguard of the mass
resistance to such policies in Nigeria (and in many other third world
states) 12 ' were an attempt to deal in some way with the human rights
contradictions that are often generated when third world countries
attempt dual political and economic transitions. In this vein, the paper
maps and demonstrates the intensification and augmentation of repression that have occurred as a result in a country like Nigeria. The paper
argues that the repression of labour rights and the weakening of labour
power in the service of the IMF/WB-style economic reform agenda of ruling
regimes in Nigeria and other such transitional third world countries marks
the emergence of a new kind of "full belly thesis" that inappropriately
prioritizes economic development over certain kind of political rights; one
that has nevertheless been welcomed by the more powerful (mostly
Western) states that otherwise advocate the observance of human rights
than earlier iterations of this type of thesis. I also contend that this
discrepancy in the treatment of the older and newer kinds of full belly
thesis is explained, at least in part, by the substitution of ideology that has
occurred in the meantime. While the older full belly thesis was intended to
serve the ends of a largely import-substituting self-reliance-based economic
ideology in the third world that obstructed foreign (especially Western)
imports, the newer full belly thesis is decidedly the servant of a neo-liberal
market liberalization-based ideology that is seen as favourable to foreign
(especially Western) economic penetration in the third world. This
repressive approach to managing popular resistance to aspects of the IMF/
WB-style economic reforms in Nigeria (and other such countries) is, at best,
misguided.

121 For example, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was, and remains,
central to the mobilization of popular resistance to political and economic policies
that disadvantage the poor majority in South Africa. See: <http:/www.cosatu.org.za>
(last accessed 21 June 2006). In Brazil, current president Lula da Silva's independent
labour union and even his governing labour-aligned worker's party has always played
a similar role. See: <http://www.americas.org/item-27> (last accessed 21 June 2006).

